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C6MMENTS
never vests in the murderer so that there can be no cry of "forfeiture".
Give the "strict constructionists" a statute they can construe in only
one manner - a statute that answers the query: "Can a murderer acquire
property by or as a consequence of his crime and keep it?" -r- in simple
terms subject to a single interpretation -- "No!"
ESTELLE L. ACUE
SECURITY INTERESTS - COMMERCIAL FINANCE COMPANIES
IN FLORIDA
IN'RODUCTION
Florida needs more commerce. Transportation and large-scale financ-
ing pose problems that seem best answered by small business, since this
type of enterprise is characterized by relatively light investment in fixed
assets, a high ratio of manpower to machinery, and individualized products
and services that do not compete on a price (including transportation)
basis alone.'
Small business often raises working capital by the sale of, or borrow-
ing on, current non-cash assets, i.e., the more liquid assets exclusive of
cash.2 Commercial finance companies are typical buyers or lenders in
such transactions.3 Discussed below are the legal positions of commercial
finance companies in Florida resulting from their acquiring interests (total
or security) in accounts receivable, inventory and chattel paper.
4
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE
Seventy years ago, the Florida Supreme Court held the assignment
of a book account valid in equity.5 There can be little doubt of the
assignability of accounts receivable today.6 Furthermore, by statute, "Any
civil action at law may be maintained in the name of the real party in
interest." There may be some doubt, however, as to whether the
assignor is a necessary party plaintiff in a suit upon a partial assignment.8
An account receivable involves two major risks: (1) the solvency
1. DxKs AND HoPnNs, PRIVATE CAPITAL RgQUIEEMENTS 46-48 53-56 (Board of
Covernors of the Federal Reserve System, Postwar Economic Studies, go. 5, 1946).
2. Id. at 71. This is probably for at least two principal reasons: sheer lack of
other assets to borrow on, and the rough correlation between the amount of current non-
cash assets and the amount of business activity.
3. They are not the only financial institutions in the field, however.
4. The scope of this discussion was suggested by SEIDMAN, FINANCE COMPANIES AND
FACToRS (National Conference of Commercial Receivable Companies, New York, 1949).
In fact, this comment is really an application of the cited volume to the law of Florida,
omitting two chapters dealing with drop-shipments and with imports and exports. The
volume cited also provided valuable practical observations reflected throughout this paper.
5. Sammis v. L'Engle, 19 Fla. 800 (1883).
6. "Under the common law, a right of action, choses in action, future or contin-
gent interests, possible and existing estates or interest, were not assignable, but all of
these are now assignable by statute or in equity." Richardson v. Holman, 160 Fla. 65,
71, 33 So.2d 641, 644(1948).
7. FLA. STAT. §45.01 (1951); Smith v. Westcott, 34 Fla. 430, 16 So. 332 (1894)
(assignee of accounts and due bills).
8. See Robinson v. The Springfield Co., 21 Fla. 203, 217-219 (1885).
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of the account debtor, and (2) the validity of the account, tested accord-
ing to whether or not the terms of the underlying contract were met.
Generally, no assignee assumes risks of the second type, for the assignor
impliedly warrants the validity of the account. The outright purchaser
of accounts, in contradistinction to the lender taking an assignment as
collateral, risks the solvency of the debtor, The lender who takes an
assignment as security will not, of course, lose his loan if the account
debtor is insolvent. In effect, the assignor takes only the first type of
risk. This distinction has been applied in order to hold that, where
the assignee has full recourse against the assignor for any non-payment
of the account, the assignee really takes the assignment as security for
a loan and the usury laws are applicable. "  Since a purchaser of accounts
risks the account debtor's insolvency, his actual operation, as well as his
legal position, is different. His clients wish to share credit risks as well as
to raise working capital, and they probably are in better financial condi-
tion on the average than the clients of lenders who take assignments as
security.
Statutory Protection of Assignments:
The assignee of accounts receivable may become a "protected" assignee
tinder Florida statute 0 if the "assignors main executive office in the
United States is in fact in Florida.''" This statute applies to the transfer,
other than by operation of law,12 of existing or future rights to the
payment of money under an existing contract,"3  but it does not
apply to (I ) assignments regulated by special federal or state statutes,1 '
(2) assignments secured by an interest in the goods which give rise to
the account,' (3) assignments of rights represented by judgments or
negotiable instruments, 6 or (4) assignments of documentary choses in
action, e.g., insurance policies, savings accounts." Assignments are within
the scope of the act, whether for security or not.18
Protection is secured by filing a notice of assignment, signed by the
assignor and the assignee, with the Secretary of State.'9 The notice can
state that the assignor has assigned, or intends to assign, one or more
accounts receivable, without listing the accounts.20 It protects past assign-
ments from the date of filing for one year and future assignments from
9. Home Bond Co. v. McChesney, 239 U.S. 568 (1916); Petition of National Dis-
count Co., 272 Fed. 570 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 635 (1921); ef. Brew-
ster Shirt Corp. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 159 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1947).
10. FLA. STAT. C. 524 (1951).
11. FLA. STAT. § 524.02(1 ) (1951).
12. Fi. STAT. § 524.01(4) 1951).
13. PLA. STAT. § 524.01( a) (1951).
14. PtA. STAT. § 524.01(1 )(b) (1951).
15, TLA. STAT. § 524.01(1) C) (1951).
16. F.. STAT. §§ 542.01(l)(d) 1, 2 (1951).
17. FLA. STAT. § 524.01( ()(d) 3 (1951).
18. FL. STAT. § 524.01(4 (19 51).
19. FLA. STAT. § 524.02(1) (1951).
20. Ibid.
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the date when made for one year after the filing.21 The arrangement may
be extended, one year at a time, by filing renewals signed by the assignor
and the assignee. 22  An assignee may extend the protection of past pro-
tected assignments, one year at a time, by filing affidavits to the effect that
he holds one or more outstanding protected assignments from the assignor.23
Instruments filed are indexed under the assignor's name,24 and the filing
fee for each instrument is one dollar.25
A protected assignee takes subject to judicial liens on the account
before his protection begins.2 " As between successive assignees of the
same account, the first to file prevails unless he (1) had written notice
of a prior assignment, or (2) agreed in writing to other priorities.27 Aside
from the limitations just set out, the protected assignee prevails over
creditors and assignees of the assignor as to the account or the proceeds
and may recover the proceeds from their possession.28
An assignment is not invalidated by the assignor's dealing with the
account or returned goods pertaining to it, even if the assignee acquiesces
in such conduct. 29  However, the assignment is subject to the defenses
of the account debtor existing at the time when he receives written notice
of the assignment.30
It appears that the statute has not been construed in the reported
opinions to date.3 '
Other Assignments
Other assignments are affected by statute to the extent that they
are made subject to protected assignments.3 2  Outside of this, they would
seem to be as effective as they were before the statute.
Florida case law on the assignment of accounts has developed prin-
cipally in situations where the assignee sues the debtor (with an exception
discussed later). The assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor,33 but
adjustments between the debtor and the assignor after notice to the debtor
of the assignment form no defense to the assignee's action against the
debtor - up to the amount of the assignee's real interest, i.e., the loan
secured by the assignment. 34 As a procedural matter, the debtor was limited
under a 1931 statute&5 to counterclaims arising out of the same transac-
21. FLA. STAT. § 524.03(l), 524.04(11 (1951).
22. FL-. STAT. § 524.03(I) and (2) (1951).
23. FLA, STAT. § 524.03(3) (1951).
24. FLA. STAT. § 524.02(2) (1951).
25. FLA. STAT. § 524.02(51 (1951).
26. FL, STAT. § 524.04(2) (a) (1951).
27. FLA. STAT § 524.04(2)(b) (1951).
28. FLA. STAT. § 524.04(3) (1951).
29. FLA. STAT. § 524.05 (1951).
30. FLA. STAT. § 524.06 (1951).
31. FLA., STAT. ANN., c. 524 (Supp. 1952).
32. FLA. STAT. § 524.04(2)(b) (1951).
33. Florida East Coast Ry. v. Eno, 99 Fla. 887. 128 So. 622 (1930).
34. Howard v. Pensacola & A.R. Co., 24 Fla. 560, 5 So. 356 (1889).
35. Fla. Laws 1931, c. 14823.
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tion,.3  The same was true under an earlier statute,"7 but even such
counterclaims may have been unavailable to the debtor under the earlier
statute since it only allowed the set-off of "mutually existing" claimsY9
Under the present statute, 89 the debtor's counterclaims arising out of
the same transaction are compulsory,' 0 while all others are permissive.41
The last provision certainly should not be understood to increase the
substantive rights of the debtor.
The assignment by a contractor of rights to progress payments has
brought a fourth party into the picture in three cases where the debtor
was a governmental unit and required the contractor to have a surety.42
The problem required an application of the theory that the surety is
subrogated to the rights of the governmental unit upon paying it the
damages caused by default. In the first case, the town retained less than
the percentage of progress payments it was entitled to retain. The court,
holding for the surety, reasoned as follows: (1) the lending assignee
stands in the shoes of the contractor, (2) the surety is subrogated to the
position of the town, (3) the contractor had no right to payment from
the town at the time of default, and (4) therefore the surety prevails over
the assignee.48
The Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in the second
case for the assignee because the town had no right to retain the proceeds,
and the assignee showed that the loan was used in furthering the work. 44
While the first two cases are somewhat unusual as regards the ordinary
financing of accounts by commercial finance companies, they form a
background for the important case of Coconut Grove Exchange Bank v.
New Amsterdam Casualty Co.41 which involved the assignment of con-
tract rights against the federal government. The dissenting judge, draw-
ing on the law of the two preceding cases, felt that the assignee had failed
to prove an equitable position equivalent to that of the assignees in those
cases;46 but the court held that the surety had failed to prove any such
useless diversion of the loans as would avoid the effect of what the court
held to be the controlling federal statute.47 That statute makes assign-
36. Panama City v. Federal Reserve Bank, 97 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1938).
37. Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws of 1927, § 4326; Birmingham Trust Co. v. Jackson
County Mill Co., 41 Fla. 498, 27 So. 43 (1899); accord, Kilcrease v. White, 6 Fla. 45
(1855) (overdue note).
38. Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws of 1927, § 4326. See the reasoning in Binningbam
Trust Co. v. Jackson County Mill Co., 41 Fla. 498, 503-506, 27 So. 43, 44-45 (1899).
39. FLA. STAT. § 52.11 (1951).
40. FLA. STAT. § 52.11(1) (1951).
41. FLA. STAT. § 52.11(2) (1951).
42. Infra notes 43, 44, 5.
43. Union Indemnity Co. v. City of New Smyrna, 100 Fla. 980, 130 So. 453 (1930).
44. Town of River Junction v. Maryland Cas. Co., 110 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 634(1940),second appeal 133 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1943).
45. 149 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1945).
46. Id. at 79-81.
47. REv. STAT. § 3477 (1875), as amended, 54 STA-r. 1029 (1940), 31 U.S.C. §
203 (1946).
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ments of contract rights against the federal government valid for all
purposes if certain notices are given, as they were in the instant case.
Therefore this statute fills one of the express gaps in the Florida act.48
INVENTORY
Generally speaking, a lender may protect his security interest in
the borrower's inventory or stock in trade by (1) giving public notice of
his interest, (2) divesting the borrower of control over the goods, or (3)
neither.4 9  It follows that a discussion of inventory loans, like Gaul, is
divided into three parts: mortgages, pledges and trust receipt transactions.
The reader might keep in mind the differences between an inventory
of raw materials which may be transformed into other goods by manufac-
turing or processing but which is not likely to be sold, and an inventory
of finished goods which is ready for and intended for sale. However,
these differences are not specially reflected in the Florida law, with the
possible exception of the Uniform Trust Receipts Law.50
Mortgages of Inventory
"Mortgages" includes any conveyance in writing of a property interest
from a debtor to or for his creditor as security for the payment of money."'
The" lender must protect his mortgage by recording it or by taking
possession of the goods mortgaged." If the lender fails to record-his
mortgage but later takes possession, an intervening mortgagee for value
without notice prevails.58
A mortgage is void in law to the extent that it covers stock in trade
retained by the debtor if the debtor has the express or implied power to
sell the goods as usual and need not account to the mortgagee for the
proceeds.54 However, the arrangement may be a valid pledge if the debtor
or his employee segregates the mortgaged inventory and holds it as agent
for, and accounts to, the mortgagee.S A lender may successfully defend
his lien by showing that a new arrangement of the pledge type has been
substituted for an earlier void mortgage. 0  Nevertheless, the general rule
defeats one of the major attractions of inventory loans as well as of loans
on current assets in general: the asset will be converted into cash in a
short time under normal operations so that the debt can be paid. Stated
in another way. the general rule seems to prevent an inventory mortgage
from being a self-liquidating arrangement.
48. FLA. STAT. § 524.01(1) (b) (1951) (recording act not applicable to assignments
regulated by special federal statutes).
49. See later discussion of unrecorded trust receipts.
50. FLA. STAT. c. 673 (1951).
5I. Fi. STAT. § 679.01 (195t).
52. FL. STAT. § 698.01 (1951).
53. Spellman v. Beeman, 70 Fla. 575, 70 So. 589 (1916).
54. Eckman v. Munnerlyn, 32 Fla. 367, 13 So. 922 (1893); Logan v. Logan, 22
Fla. 561 1886).
55. Garrett & Co. v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 120 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1941).
56. First Nat. Bank v. Wittich, 33 Fla. 681, 15 So. 552 (1894); see the explana-
tion of this case in Garrett & Co. v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 120 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1941).
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Assuming that there is no power of sale, a mortgage on a fluctuating
inventory would apparently be valid in Florida against the mortgagor, for
the court has held that a mortgage can by its terms create an equitable
lien on after-acquired property which attaches when the property comes
into the mortgagor's possession. 7  However, there was only the barest
intimation that the lien would be valid against third parties,58 and a con-
trary view is possible.' The unresolved problem is important both as to
inventories ready for sale and as to inventories to be used in manufacture.
The latter case will probably include the former in that the mortgage will
attempt to cover raw materials, goods in process and finished products:
newly purchased raw materials are to be after-acquired raw materials at
first, after-acquired goods in process while they are being changed, and
after-acquired finished products when they are in final saleable form.
However, all of this is to little avail if the lien is not valid against third
persons. A different approach, possible if the raw materials form the major
part of the finished product, is to apply the doctrine of accession to the
mortgagee's interest in the raw materials. 0 Finally, certain Florida statutes
have limited applicability, as discussed below.
Unless otherwise provided, mortgages on livestock extend to the
offspring.6 ' Future crops may be mortgaged if the land on which they are
to be raised is described, 62 but the lien does not attach until the crop
reaches the first stage of growth. 01  Therefore, if a mortgage on the
land which by its terms includes the crops is already in default when the
crop reaches the first stage of growth, that mortgage prevails over a specific
mortgage on the crops. 4 Aside from the foregoing provisions for mortgag-
ing "agricultural inventory", the question of whether or not a mortgage
can validly attach to goods manufactured in the future remains unan-
swered at this point.
The Florida Legislature has created a statutory lien which - like a
mortgage - is a voluntary arrangement and ought to be recorded.65  At
first glance it appears to be a solution: "Any person who shall procure a
loan or advance of money . . . to aid him in the business of planting
farming, timber getting or any other kind of business in this state. ...
shall .. .be held to have given to the lender ...a statutory lien of prior
dignity to all other incumbrances," except liens for labor and in favor of
landlords, upon all the timber, crops, products "or anything else made
57. Marion Mortgage Co. v. Teate, 98 Fla. 713, 124 So. 172 (1929).
58. Id. at 718, 124 So. at 174.
59. Zartman v. First Nat. Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907); see Carlton
v. Marion Mortgage Co., 105 Fla. 445, 446, 141 So. 304, 305 (1932) (concurring
opinion).
60. Cf. Bancroft Steel Co. v. Kuniholm Mfg. Co., 301 Mass. 91, 16 N.E.2d 78
(1938) (holder of retained title to steel recovers baby strollers).
61. FLA. STAT. § 699.04 (1951).
62. FLA. STAT. § 700.01 (1951).
63. E. C. Fitz & Co. v. Eldridge, 129 Fla. 647, 176 So. 539 (1937).
64. Neal v. Bradenton Production Credit Ass'n, 146 Fla. 208, 200 So. 845 (1941).
65. FLA. STAT. § 85.22 (1951).
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or grown . . . through the assistance of said loan . ... ." Although Florida
has no Factors' Lien Act" to protect the security interests in. inventories
held by complying lenders, the statute just quoted seems comparable.
However, the statute requires an instrument to be recorded in the county
"wherein such business of planting, farming, or timber getting is con-
ducted." Furthermore, the court has held demurrable the plaintiff-
lender's failure to allege that the borrower was in the business of pro-
ducing citrus fruit. 7 It appears that this provision, too, is applicable only
to loans on "agricultural (and lumbering) inventories".
In summary, the utility of a mortgage is doubtful if the inventory
will normally be sold or subjected to manufacturing or processing. The
financing of inventory not constantly in use can be done by pledge (as
discussed below). A pledge need not be recorded; and one type of
pledge, field warehousing, requires very little inconvenience. All in all,
financing inventories by mortgage seems a poor choice for the lender.
Pledges of Inventory
The simplest pledge is a transfer of possession to the lender as
security. As long as a party acting on the lender's behalf retains control
of the property, the pledge remains valid.1" The possession necessary is
that discussed in the matter of void mortgages replaced by pledges. 9
Practically, goods which are constantly being worked, processed or
sold by the borrower are not susceptible of pledge. Rather, goods are
amenable to pledge when their form is "static" or "passive". Generally,
this is during transportation or storage. Most lenders are in neither busi-
ness, yet they do want control. Therefore, a two-step arrangement is
used: (1) the carrier or warehouseman issues a receipt to the borrower-
shipper or borrower-depositor which is-a unique document and is essential
to anyone trying to secure the goods from the carrier or warehouseman,
and (2) the borrower transfers the document to the lender. The carrier
is usually in interstate commerce70 and the transactions are governed by
the Federal Bills of Lading Act.71 The law of bills of lading will not be
covered in this discussion. 2
Florida has substantially adopted the Uniform Warehouse Receipts
66. See N.Y. PEas. PROP. LAw § 45.
67. Plant City Agricultural Credit Co. v. Pool, 103 Fla. 806, 139 So. 595 (1931).
68. Therrell v. Filer, 101 Fla. 192, 133 So. 861 (1931). Although the school
board released the bank's pledge of bonds, the state comptroller's approval-required by
statute-had not yet been given. Held: the statute was a part of the contract and the
pledge was still valid.
69. See notes 52, 53 suora.
70. See Chase & Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 94 Fla. 922, 115 So, 185
(1927); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Roe, 91 Fla. 762, 109 So. 205 (1926).
•71. 39 STAT. 538 (1916), 49 U.S.C. §§ 81 et seq. (1946).
72. While nonnegotiable bills of lading do not represent title and should not be
adequate for a valid pledge of goods, they nevertheless may be useful in the financing of
current assets: an assignor of accounts receivable is sometimes required -to give the
assignee copies of straight (nonnegotiable) bills of lading as proof of delivery of the
goods to the carrier.
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Act." Before discussing the Act, it should be noted that at least two
major types of warehousing are possible under the provision, 'Warehouse
receipts may be issued by any warehouseman. "7 4  Under one t, pe, the
goods can be deposited in a public warehouse along with the goods of
other depositors, and the parties choose to do so. In field warehousing,
the parties find it necessary or desirable to have the warehousing company
merely segregate a part of the borrower's inventory right on the borrow-
er's premises and appoint its agent to control the "branch public ware-
house". The agent is often a person who would otherwise be employed
by the borrower, but the agent is employed by and accountable to the
warehousing company for the duration of the arrangement.
Warehouse receipts may be negotiable or nonnegotiable.76 A non-
negotiable receipt is one stating that the goods are deliverable to a specified
party or to the depositor,76 and it must be marked "nonnegotiable" by the
warehouseman or else a deceived holder for value may treat it as nego-
tiable.7 7 A nonnegotiable receipt is advantageous in that (1) a holder
through a thief cannot get good title, and (2) the receipt need not be
presented in order for the depositor or the specified party to get each and
every partial delivery. 8
A receipt to order or to bearer is negotiable, 9 and all other copies of
it must be marked "duplicate" by the warehouseman. 80 Negotiable receipts
seem more useful since they imbue holders with greater rights. In fact,
a person taking a warehouse receipt by negotiation has rights substantially
analogous to those of a holder in due course of a negotiable demand note8'
except that (1) the indorsers do not guarantee the warehouseman's per-
formance of his obligations82 and (2) the warehouseman has a possessory
lien 8 for all lawful charges and claims enumerated on the receipt and for
charges for storage subsequent to the date of the receipt, even though the
amounts of the charges and claims are not stated.8 4 If the warehouseman
issues a negotiable receipt for goods, he must take up and cancel the
receipt when delivering the goods 5 or, at least, mark the ieceipt when
delivering part of the goods;86 and he need not deliver the goods to attach-
ing or levying parties unless the receipt is surrendered to him or impounded
by the court.8 ' Furthermore, the proper holder of a duly negotiated
73. FLA. STAT. C. 678 (1951).
74. FLA. STAT. § 678.01 (1951).
75. FLA. STAT. §§ 678.05 678.04 (1951).
76. FLA. STAT. § 678.04 (1951j.
77. FLA. STAT. § 678.07 (1951).
78. FIA. STAT. § 678.09 (1951).
79. FLA. STAT. § 678.05 (1951).
80. FLA. STAT. § 678.06 (1951).
81. FLA. STAT. §678.43 (1951).
82. FLA. STAT. § 678.47 (1951).
83. FLA. STAT. § 678.29 (1951).
84. FLA. STAT. § 678.30 (1951).
85. FLA. STAT. § 678.11 (1951).
86. FLA. STAT. § 678.12 (1951).
87. FLA. STAT. § 678.25 (1951).
COMMENTS
receipt gets title to the goods equivalent to that of a purchaser in good
faith for value from the depositor,88 thus invoking the distinction between
void and voidable titles.
The standard of care of a warehouseman is that of a reasonably careful
owner of similar goods.89 He must keep the goods separate,0 except that
he may commingle fungibles, 9' in which case the depositors are tenants in
common and suffer any nonnegligent loss pro rata .
2
Warehousemen have a reasonable time to determine opposing rights 8
and may interplead adverse claimants.9 4  There are special provisions for
sales to satisfy a warehouseman's lien"W and for sales of perishable,""
hazardous,' or unclaimed 8 goods.
Significant Florida decisions to date have dealt with the nature of a
warehouse receipt, Although as a written contract its terms cannot be
varied by parol, its use as mere evidence of the amount converted by a
depositor results in the admissibility of parol evidence to vary the quantity
and condition of goods set forth in the receipt.9  The sale of a warehouse
receipt was held not to be within the Uniform Sale of Securities Law.100
The court said, "Such bonded warehouse certificates . . . constitute evi-
dence of title to personal property . . . .The title . . . is transferred by
the assignment and transfer of the certificate . . . ."10 It appears that
the lender who protects his security interest in the borrower's inventory
by taking a negotiable receipt issued by a sound warehouseman is in as
good a position as if he took possession himself.
Trust Receipts
Florida enacted the Uniform Trust Receipts Law in 1951102 The
most significant effect of this law upon the general picture of inventory
loans in Florida is that the lender - for a limited period of time - can
acquire a security interest in personal property of the borrower valid
against judgment creditors by a mere agreement, and without giving public
88. FLA. STAT. § 678.43 (1951).
89. FLA. STAT. § 678.21 (1951); Dixie Frozen Food & Storage v. Cox, 158 Fla. 88,
27 So.2d 672 (1946).
90. FA. STAT. § 678.22 (1951).
91. FLA. STAT. § 678.23 (1951).
92. United States v. Jacksonville, 167 F.Zd 366 (5th Cir. 1948). In this case, the
amount remaining after the loss was sufficient to meet all claims because of accumulated
excess fractions of units deposited, but the court held that the depositors and the unascer-
tained titleholders of the excess must all share the nonnegligent loss pro rata.
93. FLA. STAT. § 678.18 (1951).
94. FLA. STAT. § 678.17 (1951).
95. FuA. STAT. § 678.33 (1951).
96. FLA. STAT. §§ 678.34 ,678.37 (1951).
97. FLA. STAT. § 678.34 (1951).
98. FLA. STAT. § 678.37 (1951).
99. Wicoma Inv. o. v. Pridgeon, 137 Fla. 540, 188 So. 597 (1939).
100. Mutual Bankers Co. v. Terrell, 130 Fla. 583, 178 So. 399 (1938). The Uni-
form Sale of Securities Law lists warehouse receipts as securities, FIA. STAT. § 517.02(1)
(1951), but exempts sales by or for pledgees or mortgagees. FLA. STAT. § 517.06(1)
(1951). The court mentioned neither provision.
101. Id. at 587, 178 So. at 401.
102. FA. STAT. c. 673 (1951).
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notice or in any way divesting the borrower of possession. A detailed
outline of the law follows.
Certain definitions appear crucial before any analysis of the Act.
"Goods" includes personal chattels other than money, choses in action,
or fixtures. 1 3  "Documents" includes any document of title to goods.'0 4
"Instruments" includes negotiable instruments, stocks and bonds, and
"credit or investment instruments of a sort marketed in the ordinary
course of business or finance."'"' '  "Value" is given where chattels are
taken for consideration adequate to support a simple contract, or are
taken in satisfaction of or as security for an antecedent obligation; 0" but
"new value" is not given in the latter case, nor does "new value" include
renewals or extensions of existing obligations. 07
A valid trust receipt is the conveyance in writing of a security interest
to a lender0 8 pursuant to a trust receipt transaction) 09  A trust receipt
transaction has three essentials.
First, there must be a transaction of a particular nature. Either the
lender or another delivers goods, documents or instruments to the borrower
in which the lender has, or for new value promptly gets, a security interest;
or the lender gives new value for a security interest in instruments exhibited
to the lender but retained by the borrower; or the lender gives new value
for a security interest in goods or documents whether or not the borrower
has possession before or after of the goods or documents and whether or
not the borrower retains possession of the goods thereafter." 0
Secondly, the borrower must sign and deliver a conveyance of the
security interest, or there must be a written contract to give such a
writing"' (the latter is as effective as the forner throughout the Act)." 2
Finally, the transaction must have a particular purpose or the sub-
stantial equivalent. The purpose of the borrower's possession of goods,
documents or instruments must be their sale or exchange; or, in the case
of goods or documents, the preparation of the goods for sale - including
manufacturing, processing, transporting and storing -; or, in the case
of instruments, the delivery to a principal or depositary or registrar for
collection of the instruments and the like." 
3
The usefulness of the law, aside from the protection afforded bailors
of instruments, is principally in transactions common to inventory loans.
103. FLA. STAT. § 673.01(4) (1951).
104. FLA. STAT. § 673.01(2) 1951).
105. FLA. STAT. § 673.01 (5) (1951).
106. FLA. STAT. § 673.01(15) (1951).
107. FLA. STAT, § 673.01(7) (1951).
108. 'Lender" will be used where the act reads "entruster" and "borrower" where it
reads "trustee."
109. FLA. S'rAT. § 673.02(2) (1951).
110. FLA. STAT. § 673.02(1) 1951).
Ill. FLA. STAT. §§ 673.02(1) 1,2 (1951).
112. FLA. STAT. § 673.04 (1951).
113, FLA. STAT. § 673.02(3) (1951).
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Some of these are lending to borrowers so that they can pay for goods
presently being delivered to them, delivering negotiable warehouse receipts
to borrowers so they can reacquire some or all of their inventory, and
lending on inventory already in the borrowers' possession if there is an
active purpose for that possession. The sale of inventory and the use
of it for manufacturing or processing are plainly within the contemplation
of the Act.
Between the lender and borrower the terms of the trust receipt are
valid, but there can be no forfeiture except in the case of articles manu-
factured by style or model."14  The lender, upon default, can retake
possession peaceably,'" and a lender in possession may sell after notice
and ten days.""
The lender may protect his interest by filing or by taking possession.,
While protected, the security interest is valid against all parties'18 except
(1) good faith purchasers for value of negotiable instruments or docu-
ments;1" (2) parties having specific liens usual in the course of activities
prior to sale, e.g., warehousing, if such liens arose from contract and
excepting landlords' liens;' 2 0 (3) lien creditors without notice whose liens
were perfected before filing, or who secured the issuance of process before
filing, and levied or attached promptly after the issuance of process;' 2'
(4) buyers in the ordinary course of trade if the borrower has apparent
authority to sell;' 22 and (5) good faith purchasers for value, other than
buyers in the ordinary course of trade, who obtain possession before
filing. 123 "Buyers in the ordinary course of trade" includes generally any
good faith vendee for value but not pledgees, mortgagees, lienors, nor
transferees in bulk. 24  "Purchasers" includes persons taking security
interests created by contract and transferees in bulk.' 5  Most of the
exceptions obviously apply to a recorded (filed) trust receipt rather than
one where the goods have been reduced to possession by the lender. The
recorded trust receipt is more like a mortgage than an unrecorded trust
receipt in that the lender's security interest is protected by public notice,
or occasionally, by possession both in the case of a recorded trust receipt
and a mortgage. However, it is far more convenient to discuss all trust
receipts together.
While the recorded trust receipt may be compared to a mortgage,
114. FLA. STAT. §§ 673.05, 673.06(5) (1951).
115. FLA. STAT. § 673.06(2) (1951).
116. FLA. STAT. § 673.06(3)(b) (1951).
117. FLA. STAT. § 673.07(2) (1951).
118. FLA. STAT. § 673.071 )(a) (1951).
119. FLA. STAT. § 673.09(1)(a) (1951).
120. FLA. STAT. § 673.11 (1951).
121. FLA. STAT. § 673.08(2) (1951).
122. FLA. STAT. § 673.09(2)(a) and (c) (1951).
123. FtA. STAT. § 673.09 2)(b) (1951).
124. FLA. STAT. § 673.01(1) (1951).
125. FLA. STAT. § 673.01(11) 1951).
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there is little in Florida law resembling the situation created by the
unrecorded trust receipt under which the borrower retains possession.
The reader is forewarned that the period of thirty days appears several
times in the provisions for the validity of trust receipts. That is because
the law gives an unrecorded trust receipt a certain validity for thirty days,
but protection against third parties is substantially reduced after that
time unless the trust receipt is recorded.
Exceptions (1), (2) and (4) to the validity of a recorded trust
receipt, as described above, arc also exceptions to the validity of an unre-
corded receipt.12  Purchasers other than buyers in the ordinary course
of trade take clear of the trust receipt if they give new value during the
first thirty days and secure delivery before the trust receipt is recorded, or
if they give value after the thirty-day period and secure delivery before
the trust receipt is recorded."" A transferee in bulk cannot qualify under
the first test.128  It is clear that the description of exception (5) to the
validity of recorded trust receipts is incomplete in that there is the addi-
tional requirement of prevailing purchasers that they give new value if
they purchase within the first thirty days after the trust receipt transaction.
An unrecorded trust receipt is valid against all creditors of the borrower, 12 9
with or without notice, for thirty days; but after thirty days it is void
against one who, after the thirty day period, becomes a lien creditor with-
out notice,130 or against a trustee in bankruptcy if the petition is filed
after the thirty day period.131 Therefore, the description of exception (3)
to the validity of recorded trust receipts is incomplete in that the creditor
who is to prevail must perfect his lien after the thirty-day period as well
as before recording.
To summarize the disadvantages of the unrecorded trust receipt not
attached to the recorded trust receipt, a division in time may be made.
During the first thirty days, good faith purchasers for new value, including
mortgagees and pledgees, but excluding transferees in bulk, take clear of
the unrecorded trust receipt. After thirty days, good faith purchasers
for value - including transferees in bulk'32 - take clear of the unrecorded
trust receipt, and the unrecorded trust receipt is void against lien creditors
who become such without notice after thirty days and against trustees in
bankruptcy if the petition is filed after thirty days.
The thirty-day line of demarcation, coupled with the contemplation
of active purposes discussed earlier, makes the unrecorded trust receipt
a unique device. The active purpose in the case of inventory loans is
generally the acquisition or release of inventory for some step that will
126. See notes 119, 120, 122 su/ra.
127. FLA. STAT. 673.09(2)(b) (1951).
128, Ibid.
129. FA. StAT. § 673.08(1) (1951).
130. FLA. STAT. § 673.08(2) (1951).
131. FLA. STAT. § 673.08(2) (b) (1951).
132. But cf. FLA. STAT. c. 726 (1951) (Bulk Sales Law).
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bring it closer to final sale. The final sale will produce proceeds which
may be used to pay off the underlying loan, thus terminating the security
interest. A thirty-day time limit is contemplated. Thus, the unrecorded
trust receipt transaction should normally be a promptly self-liquidating
arrangement.
The security interest will not continue as long as the borrower owes
any debt to the lender. The trust receipt is security only for the obliga-
tion incurred during the transaction, or for obligations for which the prop-
erty held under a trust receipt was previously security; but the security
does not extend to other past obligations or to any future obligations.'
Generally, a lender has rights, as against all parties in regard to
whom his security interest is valid, to the identifiable proceeds of the
property covered by the trust receipt and to debts owed the borrower by
any purchasers or buyers who prevail against the trust receipt." 4  If the
lender fails to demand an accounting within ten days of learning of the
existence of proceeds, he waives his special rights to the identifiable pro-
ceeds.13 5 However, if he demands an accounting within ten days after
the proceeds come into existence, or a petition in bankruptcy is filed
with regard to the borrower in that same period, the lender has a priority
for the value of the proceeds, whether identifiable or not. 3 6 In effect, the
lender had better demand an accounting within ten days after sale -
another reason why the trust receipt transaction should be a self-liquidating
arrangement.
The Florida Trust Receipts Law apparently has not been construed
by the court."' In dealing with a trust receipt issued under the law of
another state, and prior to the passage of the Florida Act, the court held
it ineffective under facts which would probably lead to the same con-
clusion in Florida today."" However, the court used language somewhat
discouraging to the proponents of trust receipts: the plaintiff "required
the dealer to execute what is termed a trust receipt, which appears from
the record to be an instrument which might be either construed as a
receipt for property to be held in trust or a chattel mortgage. If construed
as a receipt for property to be held in trust, it carried with it authority to
sell and dispose of the property, and to account for the proceeds thereof."13'
In an earlier case, the court also reached the result indicated by the present
statute by applying the law of conditional sales and agency to a trust
receipt transaction.1 40 Surely the court would have no difficulty in identi-
133. FLA. STAT. § 673.14 (1951).
134. FLA. STAT. § 673.10 (1951).
135. FLA. STAT. § 673.10(c) (1951).
136. FLA. STAT. § 673.10(b) (1951).
137. FLA. STAT. ANN. c. 673 (Supp. 1952).
138. Wooton v. Carrollton Acceptance Co., 103 Fla. 237, 137 So. 390 (1931).
139. Id. at 239-240, 137 So. at 391.
140. Glass v. Continental Guaranty Corp., 81 Fla. 687, 88 So. 876 (1921).
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fying a trust receipt and determining its basic effects under the present
statutes.
Before concluding the subject of inventory loans, it seems worth
noting that under the Uniform Trust Receipts Law an attempted pledge,
which does not qualify as a trust receipt transaction and wherein the
borrower retains possession, is valid as a security interest against all
creditors of the borrower with or without notice for ten days if (1) the
lender gives new value in reliance thereon, or (2) if the lender gives the
borrower possession of pledged property for a temporary and limited
purpose. 4' The pledge is otherwise invalid against creditors and'is invalid
generally against good faith purchasers for value, until the lender takes
or retakes possession. 4
2
CIIAn'EL PAPER
When a businessman sells chattels on credit to the consuming public,
he often gets notes secured by interests in the chattels sold. This is a
normal arrangement for the sale of automobiles, furniture and household
appliances. A businessman may lend cash rather than credit to a member
of the general public and take as protection a security interest in chattels
already owned by the borrower. The notes and the documents giving
the businessman a security interest in the chattels constitute chattel
paper for the purposes of this discussion. (If the documents are condi-
tional sale agreements, the term "conditional sales paper" will be used;
and if the documents are chattel mortgages, "chattel mortgage paper").
The businessman may turn his chattel paper into working capital by sell-
ing it, or by transferring it to a lender as collateral for a loan.
The financing of chattel paper giving security interests in automobiles
is affected to some extent by statutes. The motor vehicle title registration
provisions create a comparatively certain test as to the validity of con-
tractual liens on automobiles. 4' While that law may impose certain
annoying formalities, these requirements generally protect the holder of
the chattel paper. One chapter of the Florida statutes contains an attempt
to prevent the manufacturer or distributor of motor vehicles from coercing
retail dealers into financing their chattel paper with a designated lender.
1 44
Whatever effect this law may have on the economic problems involved,
it voids the contract between the manufacturer or distributor and the
dealer, 45 but apparently does not affect the validity of the financing
arrangements.
Statutes in Florida also deal with the field of smaller loans or exten-
sions of credit to consumers. A chapter grants licensed small loan busi-
nesses the right to charge interest' at the annual rate of forty-two per
141. FLA. STAT. § 673.03 (1951).
142. Ibid.
143. FLA. STA'r. §§ 319.15 et seq. (1951).
144. Fis. STAT. c. 545 (1951).
145. FLA. STAT. §§ 545.10, 545.02 (1951).
146. FLA. STAT. c. 516 (1951).
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cent, 47 but if they violate the provisions of the law the offending loans are
unenforceable, 41 Another chaptert 40 allows registered persons who extend
three hundred dollars credit or less to consumers to charge more than is
otherwise legal.' ",' However, such charges by unregistered persons for
extending a similar amount make the contract void'5" - but conditional
sales of automobiles are expressly exempted from the law;' 1 2 and the general
usury laws apply to interest on loans, but apparently not to carrying charges
added to conditional sales prices. 1 3  Furthermore, it is probable that a
party financing licensed small loan companies and unregistered extenders
of small amounts of consumer credit would be protected if he were a
holder in due course of negotiable instruments. 54
Courts and legislatures which hope to protect the innocent public
against the villains of the commercial world'55 may well place the finance
company in its dealings with chattel paper in a position substantially differ-
ent from that which it has when lending on inventory or dealing with
accounts receivable. In the latter two cases, the finance company is usually
thrown into conflict with other members of the commercial world; but,
in financing chattel paper, the company must sooner or later meet the
members of the general public in legal battle.
Generally, chattel paper may consist of notes accompanied by (1) a
chattel mortgage, or (2) a conditional sale contract.'5" Although either
serves the same general purpose, the legal principles and results are quite
different, even between original parties to the transaction. 57 Therefore,
the transferring of the two types of chattel paper will be treated separately.
Chattel Mortgage Paper
Since chattel mortgages are used less frequently in Florida for con-
sumer credit transactions than conditional sales contracts,5  the law is
not as well developed. It seems sound to add to the law of chattel mort-
gages by engrafting upon it the law of real estate mortgages wherever
applicable, i.e., wherever the nature of the property snould have no effect
on the decision. For instance, both chattel mortgages and real estate
mortgages should be recorded.5" ' but the statutes require the recording of
147. FLA. STAT. § 516.14 (1951).
148. FLA. STAT. § 516.18(2) (1951).
149. FLA. STAT. c. 519 (1951).
150. FLA. STAT. § 519.08 (1951).
151. FLA. STAT. § 519.06 (1951).
152. FLA. STAT. § 519.18 (1951).
153. FLA. STA-rT. § 687.02 (1951); Nelson v. Scarritt Motors, 48 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1950).
154. A transferee of negotiable paper without notice of usury is expressly exempt
from the operation of the general usury law. VLA. STAT. § 687.04 (1951). This'tug-
gests a similar holding in the case of special usury laws, such as Chapters 516 and'519.
155. See Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Ha. 1953).
156. See Comment, Conditional Sales-Remedies of the Seller in Florida, 7 NMI
L. Q. 385 (1953).
157. Id. at 386.
.158. Id. at 385.
159. Chattel mortgages, VLA. S'rA'r. § 698.01 (1951); real estate mortgages, FLA.
STAT. § 695.01 (1951). "
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assignments of real estate mortgages only.100 All mortgages are foreclosed
in equity.""' A deficiency decree is within the sound discretion of the
court; or the mortgagor may sue for the deficiency at common law, unless
he is the original mortgagee under a purchase money mortgage and has
bought the property at the foreclosure sale.0 2
The mortgage is incident to the debt and follows the note;163 a con-
veyance of the mortgage without the debt is inoperative.0 4  On the other
hand, a duly recorded release of the mortgage is effective against a later
assignee of the mortgage, 05 while cancellation of the note by mistake will
not avoid the mortgage since equity reinstates the debt.10
That a mortgage accompanies a note does not make the note non-
negotiable. 0 7 If the transferee of mortgage paper otherwise qualifies, he
has the privilege of a holder in due course of a negotiable note as to fore-
closing the mortgage.' The mortgagor cannot raise the defenses of
failure of consideration'60 or - if he did not secure the note - of pay-
ment. 70
Aside from the note, the assignee of a mortgage has the same rights
under the mortgage as the assignor,"' and the same is true if the note is
overdue. 7 2  However, it is no defense to foreclosure proceedings by the
assignee that the assignor had obligations to the defendant unrelated to
the assignee's mortgage. 78
Then the transferee of chattel mortgage paper is best protected by
taking an accompanying negotiable note before maturity. Otherwise, be
has only the rights which the transferor had. Despite the apparent sim-
plicity of the situation, problems do arise.
Since the mortgage follows the debt, what is to happen if the debt
is represented by several notes which mature at different times and which
end up in the hands of different indorsees? Florida follows the rule that
gives priority to the holder of the senior (earliest maturing) note;174 but
160. FLA. STAT. § 701.02 (1951).
161. FLa. STAT. § 702.01 (1951).
162. FLA. STAT. § 702.06 (1951).
163. johns v. Gillian, 134 Fla. 575, 184 So. 140 (1938); Drake Lumber Co. v.
Semple, 100 Fla. 1757, 1771, 130 So. 577 (1930).
164. Morin v. Dehon, 139 Fla. 848, 191 So. 1 (1939); Hemphill v. Nelson, 95 Fla.
498, 116 So. 498 (1928) (both cases involved quitclaim deeds).
165. Baltzell v. Daniel, 111 Fla. 303, 149 So. 639 (1933).
166. Drake Lumber Co. v. Semple, 100 Fla. 1757, 1771, 130 So. 577 (1930).
167. Scott v. Taylor, 63 Pa. 612, 58 So. 30 (1912).
168. Mullan v. Bank of Pasco County, 101 Fla. 1097, 133 So. 323 (1931). But of,
Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
169. Mullan v. Bank of Pasco County, 101 Fla. 1097, 133 So. 323 (1931).
170. Scott v. Taylor, 63 Fla. 612, 58 So. 30 (1912).
171. FLA. STAT. § 701.01 (1951).
172. Chandler v. Davis, 139 Fla. 469, 190 So. 873 (1939).
173. Pelot v. Loeb, 119 Fla. 15, 160 So. 525 (1935) (assignee of holder of first
mortgage can foreclose against holder of second mortgage, although before the assignment
garties including the holder of the first mortgage bought the property and assumed
17 morta ges).4. Mia~mi Oil Co. v. Florida Discount Corp., 102 Fla. 209, 135 So. 845 (1931).
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the indorser-assignor, or an indorsee-assignee who had notice of a prior
transfer, cannot take advantage of the rule for obvious equitable reasons. 175
If a lender is to take only a security interest in chattel paper, the
problem is to protect both his and the borrower's positiions. The borrower
will not be prejudiced by a mere assignment of the mortgage to the lender,
even though absolute by its terms, since the lender cannot give his assignee
any greater right than he had and since the borrower may prove by parol
evidence that the Iender had only a security interest?76  The rule extends
to the case where the lender also has and transfers the note if the transfer
is after maturity. 1 " From the lender's point of view, the mere hypotheca-
tion of the mortgage and note to him seems like little protection; for
instance, it appears that the borrower may thereafter execute a valid
extension agreement with the mortgagor. 17  Even if the lender takes
possession of the note and the mortgage, he may return them to the
borrower for a paticular purpose, such as foreclosure. In one case the
borrower foreclosed and bought in, but instead of mortgaging the land
to the lender he deeded it to his own daughter gratuitously. The court
enforced the lender's equitable lien against the daughter.1 79 The lender
might have even better protection under a trust receipt transaction (the
mortgage note being an "instrument"), S but even that arrangement would
be no protection against one who became a holder of the note in due
course.' Again, it is evident that the transferee of chattel mortgage paper
must look to the note.
Conditional Sales Paper
Basically, the transferee of conditional sales paper has the same
remedies against the obligor as the transferor and must make the same
election between repossession and enforcement of the debt. 8 2  Even
though the transferee has no right to possess, his ratification of reposses-
sion by the transferor bars the transferee from an action for the purchase
price.'13 The election doctrine would probably be invoked by the very
negotiation of the notes by the transferor-vendor to the transferee, 184 but
the court has expressly upheld a provision in a conditional sale contract
that the negotiability of the notes would not waive the retention of title.185
175 .Ibid. (assignment of real estate mortgage recorded before negotiation of the
senior note); McClure v. Century Estates, 96 Fla. 568, 120 So. 4 (1928) (assignor
assigned one note, held the others).
176. Hulet v. Denison, 146 Fla. 478, 1 So.2d 467 (1941).
177. Ibid.
178. Cf. Aultman v. Wilcox, 138 Fla. 11, 188 So. 800 (1939).
179. Folsom v. Farmers' Bank, 102 Fla. 899, 136 So. 521 (1931).
180. See earlier discussion.
181. FLA. STAT. § 673.09(1)(a) (1951).
182. Universal Credit Co. v. McKinnon, 106 Fla. 849, 143 So. 778 (1932). For a
complete discussion of the transferor's (vendor's) remedies, see Comment, Conditional
Sales--Reedies of the Seller in Florida, 7 Miami L.Q. 385 (1953).
183. Hamilton v. Vero Beach Reserve Mortgage Co., 107 Fla. 65, 144 So. 362 (1932).
184. Voges v. Ward, 98 Fla. 304, 321.322, 1Z3 So. 785, 791 (1929).
185. Ibid.
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Aside from the possibility of being bound by one of the "hidden" elections
just discussed, the transferee of conditional sales paper - upon default 86
- may carefully make the same choice open to the transferor-vendor,
i.e., repossession or collection of the debt; but the rules governing the
transferee's use of each remedy may vary from those governing the vendor's
use of them.
Peaceful repossession by self-help surely implies the right to possess.
The right to possess is necessary to replevin,"' and it is from the replevin
cases that one may determine when the transferee has the right to possess.
The transferee derives the right to possess from the assignment of the
conditional sale contract.""' An assignment for the purpose of partial col-
lection will not support replevin. " " A lender-transferee has no title where
the borrower-transferor, as collateral, has indorsed the notes but only
deposited the contract; the right to replevin remains in the borrower-
transferor.
9 O
\Vhen the transferee does get an assignment of the contract, his
title and his right to replevy upon default arc broadly upheld. Reposses-
sion by the transferor places all title in the transferee, and a bona fide
purchaser for value from the transferor gets nothing.' Levying creditors
of the transferor are similarly denied execution on chattels repossessed by
the transferor.0 2  In replevin, the transferee may secure damages for
unlawful detention, 1 3 but these can probably be reduced by any defenses
or claims of the obligor arising out of the original contract, such as a claim
for breach of warranty.
104
The transferee of conditional sales paper takes the notes involved by
indorsement ordinarily. Mere reference on the notes to the accompanying
conditional sale contract does not destroy the negotiability of the notes
unless the reference clearly shows the note to be burdened with the terms
of the contract." ' If the notes are negotiable by this test, the next problem
is whether or not the transferee of the conditional sales paper is a holder
in due course.
There were indications that transferees are holders in due course, 96
186. The transferee is fully liable for his repossession before default. Commercial
Credit Co. v. Willis, 126 Fla. 444, 171 So. 304 (1936).
187. FLA. STAT. §§ 78.01, 78.06 (1951).
188. Delco Light Co. v. lohn Le Roy Hutchinson Properties, 99 Fla. 410, 128 So.
831 (1930). See Brown, I., concurring at 423, 128 So. at 836.
189. Hamsan-Hull Co. v. Burton, 106 Fla. 409, 143 So. 298 (1932).
190. Roof v-. Chattanooga Wood Split Pulley Co., 36 Fla. 284, 18 So. 597 (1895).
191. Commercial Credit Co. v. Ned, 91 Fla. 505, 107 So. 639 (1926).
192. Baer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 101 Fla. 913, 132 So. 817 (1931).
193. FLA. STAT. § 78.18 (1951).
194. FLa. STAT. §§ 78.16, 52.11(1) (1951); see Delco Light Co. v. John Le Roy
Hutchinson Properties, 99 Fla. 410, 422, 128 So. 831, 836 (1930) (concurring opinion).
195. Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Fowler v. Industrial
Acceptance Corp., 101 Fla. 259, 134 So. 60 (1931); Voges v. Ward, 98 Fa. 304, 123
So. 785 (1929). But cf. Hamilton v. Vero Beach Reserve Mortgage Co., 107 Fla. 65,
144 So. 362 (1932).
196. Cf. Fowler v. Industrial Acceptance Corp., 101 Fla. 259, 262, 134 So. 60, 61
(1931); Voges v. Ward,,98 Fla. 304, 312, 123 So. 785, 788 (1929).
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but the recent case of Mutual Finance Company v. Martin'9 T has indi-
cated another view. The parties involved were the transferee-finance com-
pany, the transferor-vendor and the obligor-vendee. The following facts
were among those stipulated: 19 the company prepared the notes and
contracts for the vendor under a general financing plan, the company
investigated and approved the vendee before the sale, the vendor mis-
represented the goods, the company retained a reserve of about one-tenth
against the contract, and the company undertook to improve the chattel
before it sued. This last fact was stipulated not to charge the company
with notice of the misrepresentations or failure ot consideration. It was
held that the company could not be heard to say that it was a purchaser in
good faith since it was a party from the beginning.
It is difficult to state what sets of facts will have the same effect upon
the status of the finance dompany because the court twice limited the
decision to the particular facts and emphasized the limiting words each
time.9 " The reasoning, far less restricted, was that the finance company
was more worldly than the consumer; was better able to check on the
vendor; and, therefore, should stand the risk of the vendor's insolvency.
20
Such broad reasoning, and even the limited holding, cast doubt on a
good many financing arrangements involving the transfer of chattel paper.
So far the rights of the transferee of conditional sales paper under
the contracts and tinder the notes have been discussed separately. It should
be noted that the express terms of a conditional sale contract may give
many of the rights to the holder of the notes and the contract.
201
The transferee generally requires the engagement of the transferor
to pay any deficiency resulting upon repossession and resale. Certainly the
transferor is liable on his indorsement of the notes, but he guarantees the
maker's performance only to holders in due course20 2 - which may not
include the transferee under certain facts.2oa If the transferor merely
guarantees the obligor's payments, can the transferor invoke the doctrine
of election of remedies? An affirmative answer was given in one case
204
and with this as a basis the court reasoned as follows: the transferor owed
the transferee nothing after repossession; without an underlying debt
the transfer of the conditional sales paper could not be an unrecorded
mortgage; therefore, the transferor's levying creditor could not get at
repossessed cars in the transferor's possession. A later case held that the
transferor's independent promise to pay any deficiency, as opposed to a
mere guaranty of the obligor's debt, remained actionable after reposses-
197. 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
198. Id. at 650.
199. Id. at 652, 653.
200. Id. at 653.
201. See Voges v. Ward, 98 Fla. 304, 329, 123 So. 785, 793 (1929).
202. FLA. SrAT. § 674.68 (1951).
203. See Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
204. Baer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 101 Fla. 913, 132 So. 817 (1931).
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sion 20 . It may follow then that a transfer of conditional sales paper is
a mortgage if the transferor gives his independent promise to pay any
deficiency arising upon repossession and resale.
COMMON PROBLEMS
Certain parts of the law will affect the financing of more than one
of the three types of assets discussed. For instance, both transfers of
chattel paper and assignments of accounts receivable have parts of the law
of assignments in common. A loan on (as distinguished from a purchase
of) any of the three assets is subject to the usury laws.2
0
Perhaps the most important common problems are those of safe-
guarding the chattels involved in an inventory loan or in dealing with
chattel paper. First is insurance.
A covenant by a mortgagor to keep the property insured gives the
mortgagee an equitable lien on the proceeds. 07 The transferee of a mort-
gage and note has no insurable interest unless he gains privity with the
insurer by being mentioned in the standard mortgage clause,208 but the
transferor has an insurable interest to the extent of his liability on the
note;209 therefore the transferee must sue the transferor on the note to
secure his part of the proceeds.2 10
Suppose that the destruction of a chattel is covered by the insurer
under a policy with a standard mortgage clause including the transferee
of the conditional sales paper, but that the destruction is caused by an
inherent defect. Can the insurer subrogate himself to the rights of the
vendee-obligor as a defense against the transferee's right to the proceeds?
It has been held that there can be no such subrogation if the insurer has
not yet paid the vendee his share of the proceeds. 211 It was suggested in
the same case that the insurer would have no defense against the trans-
feree, even if the insurer paid the obligor-vendee, 212 because in Florida a
standard mortgage clause has been held to create an independent obliga-
tion of the insurer to the mortgagee, unaffected by the mortgagor's breach
of warranty. 1
8
Another problem in safeguarding chattels is the control of many
types of goods by statute.214  Special taxes may be levied on certain
205. White Motor Car v. Briles, 137 Fla. 268, 188 So. 222 (1939).
206. See Comment, Evasion and Avoidance of Florida Usury Laws, 5 MIAMI L.Q.
493, 498 (1951).
207. Sumlin v. Colonial Fire Underwriters, 158 Fla. 95, 27 So.2d 730 (1946); Atwell
v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 120 Fla. 694, 163 So. 27 (1935).
208. Whitlock v. American Central Ins. Co., 107 Fla. 13, 144 So. 412 (1932).
209. Whitlock v. American Central Ins. Co., 122 Fla. 363, 165 So. 380 (1936).
210. Whitlock v. American Central Ins. Co., 107 Fla. 13, 144 So. 412 (1932).
211. Federal Ins. Co. v. Tamiani Trail T6urs, 117 F.2d 794 (1941).
212. Id. at 796.
213. Fire Ass'n v. Evansville Brewing Ass'n, 73 Fla. 904, 75 So. 196 (1917).
214. E.g., FLA. STAT. CC. 576-580 (1951 (a gricultural supplies); FLA. STAT. C. 327
(1951) (oil and gas); FLA. STAT. C. 398, § 500.16 (1951) (narcotics and new drugs).
COMMENTS
goods'.21  The forfeiture of an innocent party's interest in an automobile
seized for carrying alcoholic beverages on which the tax is unpaid is not
unconstitutional1,2 16 but it was held not to be the intent of the Florida
Legislature to make forfeit the interest of an innocent transferee of con-
ditional sales paper.21  However, the Federal statute does imply such a
forfeiture, 218 and conditional sales contracts may hopefully include cov-
enants of the vendee not to use the chattel for such a purpose.219
Other state and local taxation is an additional problem common to
all three classes of assets. The notes or other written instruments involved
will lead to a documents tax. 220  Under the intangible personal property
tax,22' it is possible that companies should file a tax return for all the
accounts in their control. As an analogy, banking, loan and trust com-
panies must return any "credits". 222 which includes "every claim and
demand for money or other valuable thing, and every annuity or sum of
money receivable at stated periods, due or to become due." 28  Similarly,
lenders on inventory may someday be asked to return tangible personal
property held by them as owners, controllers, managers or custodians. 224
And were the finance companies to avoid those types of taxes, they could
not escape a basic license tax.
22 '
RICHARD J. HORWiCH
215. E.t., FLA. STAT. c. 210 (1951) (cigarettes); FLA. STAT. cc. 207-209 (1951)
(motor fue s).
216. J. W. Goldsmith, fr-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, (1921); Scar-
borough v. Newsorme, 150 kla. 220), 7 So.2d 321 (1942).
217. General Motors Acceptance Corp, v. State, 152 Fla. 297, 11 So.2d 482 (1943).
218. f. W. Goldsmith, Ir.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
219. See White Motor Car v. Briles, 137 Fla. 268, 275, 188 So. 222, 225 (1939).
220. FLA. STAT. C. 201 (1951).
221. FLA. STAT. C. 199 (1951).
222. FLA. STAT. § 193.09 (1951).
223. FLA. STAT. § 193.01 (1951).
224. FLA. STAT. § 200.08 (1951).
225. FLA. STAT. § 205.49 (1951) (covers cases where no other laws require licenses.
Fee: one hundred dollars).
